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Policing our ocean domain:
establishing an australian coast guard
Australia is one of the world’s largest 
maritime nations, yet few of its citizens 
know that. It is the only country to occupy 
an entire continent and, because of this 
insularity, one of the few where physical 
foreign interference is possible only from 
across the sea. Yet, being a continent, 
the area of sea that Australia commands 
is truly enormous—for some purposes 
almost 12% of the earth’s surface.
In the past, Australia has generally been ill 
prepared to accept the responsibilities that 
go with this geography. In defence of the 
nation, Australia’s alliance partners have 
at times used their naval power to contain 
armed threats in Australia’s maritime 
approaches. However, in recent decades, 
the greatly increased use of the continent’s 
maritime approaches has focused attention 
on the importance of enforcing Australian 
law over its maritime zones. Of its nature, 
Australian jurisdiction cannot be enforced 
by other nations.
Australian Government interest in law 
enforcement over the maritime approaches 
is generally taken to have begun in 1968 
with amendments to Commonwealth 
fisheries legislation to proclaim a 12 nautical 
mile (nm) fishing zone. That interest 
materialised into tangible measures only 
slowly, even though some aspects of the 
responsibility Australia was beginning to 
accept arose under international treaty. 
The more important sources of change 
were political outcries during the last 
three decades of the twentieth century, in 
reaction to which Australian governments 
allocated additional resources and changed 
management arrangements for maritime 
border security. This history of change 
through incremental crisis management 
ended in 2005 with the establishment of 
what is now Border Protection Command 
(BPC), to coordinate and control civil 
and military activities aimed at securing 
Australia’s maritime zones.
This paper examines issues to do 
with the management of Australia’s 
maritime borders, how current 
arrangements are faring, and what 
might best be done in future.
In November 2007 an Australian Labor 
Party government was elected with a 
party platform that pledged to establish 
an Australian coast guard. However, 
the direction of the election campaign 
meant that the platform was not detailed 
by a specific policy launch and the 
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2 Policing our ocean domain: Establishing an Australian coast guard
Opposition spokesperson at the time did not 
subsequently become a minister. The new 
Labor government referred policies on the 
establishment of an Australian coast guard 
and management of homeland security to 
a review.
This paper examines issues to do with the 
management of Australia’s maritime borders, 
how current arrangements are faring, and 
what might best be done in future. However, 
it should be remembered that, irrespective 
of which model Australia adopts, effective 
maritime border arrangements will often 
depend on the active cooperation of state 
government agencies, industry and the public.
In April 2008, those territorial waters 
were extended by an additional 
2.5 million square kilometres in nine 
regions outside the 200 nm zones …
The environment for maritime 
border security
Physical geography
Australia has an unavoidable interest in its 
maritime realms simply because of their 
size and location. Backed by international 
law, the country claims sovereign rights 
over waters that stretch from the tropics 
to the sub-Antarctic and, until recently, 
covered 8.2 million square kilometres. Those 
waters include the Australian Fishing Zone 
(AFZ) and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) 
that generally extend 200 nm to sea from 
the coastal baseline. They also include the 
continental shelf, where Australia has rights 
over resources on and under the seabed. 
In April 2008, those territorial waters were 
extended by an additional 2.5 million square 
kilometres in nine regions outside the 200 nm 
zones,1 bringing the total over which Australia 
asserts some form of sovereign right to 
10.7 million square kilometres. Australia claims 
more than 40% of the Antarctic mainland 
and has established an EEZ based on those 
territories, although this is not recognised by 
the international community.
Australia’s maritime zones are among the 
largest in the world. Indonesia describes itself 
as an archipelagic nation and incorporates 
seas from Southeast Asia to northern 
Australia within its boundaries, but its claims 
amount to barely more than half of Australia’s.
Australia’s maritime zones are now around 
40% larger than the landmass of the 
continent and the country claims rights over 
more waters than any other nation, including 
the US, whose EEZ encompasses 8.8 million 
square kilometres. Its claims to waters off the 
Australian Antarctic Territory, further increase 
Australia’s responsibilities. Under international 
Australia’s ocean interests
Length of continental coastline—
36,000 km
Number of land features in Australian 
territorial waters—12,000
Distances to island territories:
Christmas Island, 1,500 nm  
west of Darwin
Cocos (Keeling) Island, 1,600 nm 
northwest of Perth
Heard and McDonald Islands, 
2,200 nm southwest of Perth.
Australia has the:
world’s third largest fishing zone
world’s largest area of coral reefs,
and is the
major claimant to Antarctic Territory.
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conditions that have significant implications 
for the type of operations conducted 
by agencies responsible for Australia’s 
maritime zones and for the equipment 
they use. 
A wide variety of activities take place 
across Australia’s maritime zones. Shipping 
continues to be an important activity within 
Australia’s maritime zones and carries some 
99% of Australia’s international trade, with 
arrangements, Australia is responsible for 
managing search and rescue arrangements 
and security responses over an area that is 
about 12% of the earth’s surface.
The scope of Australia’s claims mean that it 
has sovereignty interests embracing parts of 
the Pacific, Indian and Southern oceans and 
the Tasman, Coral, Timor and Arafura seas. 
This vast geographic expanse encompasses 
a highly varied range of climatic and sea 
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4 Policing our ocean domain: Establishing an Australian coast guard
with efforts being made to protect their 
ecosystems through the establishment of 
marine parks or protected areas. These are 
also used to protect historic shipwrecks, 
oil and gas pipelines and submarine 
telecommunications cables. Marine parks 
and historic shipwrecks are often associated 
with significant local and international marine 
tourism, which has become the largest 
Australian maritime industry.
In the maritime arrangements, 
administration of legislation is not 
usually associated with the capacity 
to enforce it.
The regulatory environment
Sometimes, the conduct of these activities 
may produce circumstances that require 
action to prevent, or intercede against, 
breaches of Australian law. The Australian 
Government has constitutional power 
over defence, customs, immigration and 
quarantine matters. In areas outside 
Australia’s territorial waters, additional 
authority is generally provided by the 
Commonwealth’s external affairs powers. 
Australia’s establishment of an EEZ, and its 
proclamation of a territorial sea 12 nm in 
width, with a contiguous zone of a further 
12 nm (wherein Australia can enforce 
customs, immigration and quarantine 
laws) corresponds with the provisions of 
the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS), signed in 1982. Australia claims 
sovereign rights to exploit and manage all 
living resources within its EEZ and AFZ and to 
control the exploration for, and extraction of, 
minerals from the seabed beneath the zone.
Those rights include the management 
of fisheries and other activities that have 
environmental consequences. The right to 
3,517 vessels making a total of 10,127 voyages 
to Australia in 2005–06.2 Most of this trade 
is carried out by foreign vessels, there being 
only thirty-seven Australian-owned vessels 
in the local trade. However, a large number 
of Australians travel around the coastline in a 
variety of pleasure and sporting craft.
Almost all of the AFZ supports commercial 
levels of fish stocks, as do some areas of the 
continental shelf, such as the orange roughy 
fishery south of Tasmania. Some of these 
fisheries, such as the southern bluefin tuna 
and Patagonia toothfish, are of significant 
international interest, while other areas, 
such as the Arafura Sea and Timor Sea shark 
fisheries, are subject to exploitation by both 
traditional and commercial foreign fishers.
After a Commonwealth study into 
offshore security requirements in 
2004, the government accepted 
responsibility for the security of 
offshore facilities …
Crude oil and natural gas are extracted from 
sites in Bass Strait and off the northwest 
coast, with significant developments 
occurring in the Pilbara region as a result of 
the increased production of natural gas. After 
a Commonwealth study into offshore security 
requirements in 2004, the government 
accepted responsibility for the security of 
offshore facilities and a security regime 
was developed. The oil and gas industries 
require support activities that go beyond the 
maintenance of static offshore platforms and 
include a considerable number of support 
craft, many of which are based overseas and, 
in the northwest fields, make little or no 
contact with the Australian mainland.
Increasingly, the oceans are seen as an 
important environmental resource, 
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legislation, managed by a large number of 
agencies—according to procedures deemed 
acceptable by courts of law in a variety 
of jurisdictions—and often enforced by 
personnel of agencies different from those 
responsible for implementing particular 
matters. Twenty-four Australian Government 
agencies and an even larger cluster of state 
and territory bodies can have an interest 
in some aspect of the arrangements, 
so success depends on a high degree of 
consultation, cooperation, coordination and 
integrated planning.
control minerals exploration and exploitation 
and to manage sedentary sea life extends 
beyond the EEZ to the edge of Australia’s 
continental shelf. Those rights were 
significantly extended with the recognition of 
additional areas by the UN in April 2008.
Generally, the authority vested in legislation 
covering maritime zones has been divested 
to those agencies that normally administer 
the functional area on land. However, those 
departments whose activity is administering 
a particular field of Commonwealth activity, 
such as immigration or quarantine, usually 
have little, more often nil, capacity to 
operate in maritime zones. In the maritime 
arrangements, administration of legislation 
is not usually associated with the capacity 
to enforce it. For example, breaches of 
ordinary criminal law, largely a matter for the 
states, may also be a cause for action within 
Australia’s maritime zones. However, most 
state police forces have little capacity to 
operate offshore.
A significant complication lies in the divisions 
of responsibility in Australia’s federal 
system of government. Those divisions have 
sometimes required resolution, such as the 
constitutional settlement over offshore 
jurisdiction reached in 1980. That settlement 
ceded some powers to the states and 
Northern Territory within their own internal 
waters and to a distance of three nm out to 
sea. A somewhat different approach was 
exemplified by the Crimes at Sea Act 2000, 
which authorised the Australian Government 
to apply the relevant state law in Australia’s 
maritime zones.
The legal complexity of the enforcement 
of Australia’s interests over its maritime 
zones is as important a determinant of the 
maritime border security environment as is 
Australia’s physical geography. The Australian 
maritime security arrangements depend 
on the implementation of a wide range of 
Australian ocean law
Major powers for controlling 
maritime activities are contained in 
Commonwealth legislation such as the:
Customs Act 1901
Migration Act 1958
Defence Act 1903
Quarantine Act 1908
Fisheries Management Act 1991
Environmental Protection and 
Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999.
Responsibilities for search and rescue 
also accrue under the International 
Convention for the Safety of Lives at 
Sea (SOLAS), 1974 provisions of the 
International Maritime Organization 
(IMO). Also important are the 
International Convention on Maritime 
Search and Rescue (1979) and the 
Convention on International Civil 
Aviation (1974).
Under IMO arrangements, Australia, 
as the Security Forces Authority, is 
responsible for dealing with acts of 
violence against ships within its search 
and rescue area.
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Australian Government agencies with a 
major role in arrangements for maritime 
border security include:
Border Protection Command (BPC)— 
central command element, located within 
the Border Enforcement Division of the 
Australian Customs Service and staffed 
jointly by Australian Defence Force, 
Australian Customs Service, Australian 
Fisheries Management Authority and 
Australian Quarantine and Inspection 
Service personnel, is jointly responsible for 
managing maritime domain awareness, 
surveillance, response planning and 
response operations to control the security 
of Australian maritime zones.
Australian Defence Force (ADF)—major 
resource provider, contributes marine, aerial 
and terrestrial forces for surveillance and 
response requirements. The units supplied 
are usually under the operational control of 
Border Protection Command, either from 
Canberra or through the BPC Deputy ADF 
Commander, who is Commander Northern 
Command (NORCOM), located in Darwin.
Australian Customs Service (ACS)—major 
resource provider, contributes to an 
awareness of activity in Australia’s 
maritime zones and the capacity to 
respond through the vessels of its 
Customs Marine Unit and contract 
aerial surveillance and commercial 
security services. Also a major client of 
the arrangements, ACS is responsible for 
controlling the movement of people and 
goods in and out of Australia.
Australian Maritime Safety Authority 
(AMSA)—resource provider, contributes 
data to create maritime awareness and 
operates five aircraft that contribute to 
aerial surveillance over the maritime zones 
in addition to their search and rescue role. 
Responsible for coordinating civil aviation 
and maritime search and rescue, control 
of pollution incidents and marine safety 
awareness. AMSA is largely self-funded 
through levies and charges on the 
maritime industry.
Australian Federal Police (AFP)— 
resource provider, located within the 
Attorney-General’s portfolio, responsible 
for enforcing Commonwealth criminal law, 
including in Australia’s maritime zones.
Attorney-General’s Department (AGD)—
resource provider, supplies often time-
sensitive legal opinions in assisting the 
conduct of operations. AGD also operates 
the agencies responsible for coordinating 
counter-terrorist and disaster management 
operations.
Department of Immigration and 
Citizenship (DIAC)—support element 
and client, responsible for managing 
the movement of people in and out 
of Australia, including those arriving 
unlawfully by sea, and for the upkeep and 
repatriation of foreign fishermen seized 
for conducting unlicensed operations in 
Australian waters.
Australian Fisheries Management 
Authority (AFMA)—support element 
and client, a statutory authority within 
the Department of Agriculture, Fisheries 
and Forestry, responsible for regulating 
Commonwealth fisheries and monitoring 
and controlling the activities of Australian 
and foreign fishing vessels within the AFZ 
and in proximate international waters. 
AFMA staff are seconded to Border 
Protection Command and work in the 
National Surveillance Centre in Canberra.
A Who’s Who of Australia’s maritime security arrangements
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Australian Quarantine and Inspection 
Service (AQIS)—support element and 
client, a division within the Department 
of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry, 
responsible, in this context, for controlling 
the importation of exotic diseases and 
pests. AQIS staff are seconded to Border 
Protection Command and work in the 
National Surveillance Centre in Canberra.
Department of the Environment, Water, 
Heritage and the Arts—client, responsible 
for managing and protecting the 
Commonwealth’s marine protected areas, 
the marine environment and ecology, 
threatened species and for controlling 
dumping at sea.
Office of Transport Security—related 
partner agency, a division of the 
Department of Infrastructure, Transport, 
Regional Development and Local 
Government, responsible, in this context, 
for promoting the security of ports, ships 
and offshore facilities in partnership 
with industry bodies. It administers the 
Maritime Security Plan and the Maritime 
Security Identification Card scheme.
Other Australian Government agencies 
that have a role in maritime border 
protection are:
• Department of the Prime Minister and 
Cabinet—manages high level policy 
advice and coordination
• Australian Antarctic Division—
operates some of the scarce 
transportation resources in the 
Antarctic region
• Department of Foreign Affairs and 
Trade—manages relations with 
other countries from which threats 
to Australia’s maritime zones may 
originate and has a role in managing 
the Torres Strait Treaty Zone
• Department of Resources, Energy 
and Tourism—manages the safety 
and security of offshore oil and gas 
operations
• Great Barrier Reef Marine Park 
Authority—manages and preserves 
the Great Barrier Reef.
All states and the Northern Territory 
have a role in managing the security of 
Australia’s maritime zones, although the 
responsible agencies may differ between 
jurisdictions. In general, those agencies 
will include:
• police forces and justice agencies 
for investigating and prosecuting 
criminal activity
• agriculture and fisheries agencies for 
the management of fishing, including 
recreational activity, in state waters
• environment departments and 
protection agencies for managing and 
controlling threats to the environment 
of state waters
• transportation authorities for the 
implementation of state regulations 
especially those affecting ports, 
shipping, marine safety and other 
maritime facilities
• premiers’ or chief ministers’ 
departments for overall coordination 
between the Commonwealth and 
responsible state agencies.
In addition, commercial interests can 
often play a role, either through effectively 
implementing government programs 
and regulations or providing occasional 
assistance, such as reporting suspected 
illegal activities.
8 Policing our ocean domain: Establishing an Australian coast guard
PM&C to review arrangements for fisheries 
compliance and maritime enforcement3 was 
one of the initiatives that emerged in an 
attempt to provide better coordination and 
more cost-effective maritime border security.
The strategic direction of policies and 
operations has changed markedly 
with the establishment of the 
Strategic Maritime Management 
Committee …
The SMMC comprises senior executives 
of agencies involved in maritime border 
security. Its role is to develop national 
strategies and mechanisms for managing 
the deployment of the operational 
resources supporting maritime border 
security arrangements. SMMC oversees the 
development of intelligence, considers the 
implications of maritime security threats to 
Recent improvements in sustaining 
maritime border security
The maritime border security arrangements 
have evolved rapidly since the Border 
Protection Command was established in 
2005, with funding for many of the agencies 
increased from about the same time. Some 
of the objectives set for the BPC have not yet 
been achieved but are close to fruition and 
client agencies are well satisfied with the 
evolution of the arrangements over the past 
few years.
Integration of strategic decision making 
and intelligence functions
The strategic direction of policies and 
operations has changed markedly with the 
establishment of the Strategic Maritime 
Management Committee (SMMC), chaired 
by the Department of the Prime Minister 
and Cabinet (PM&C). The committee, which 
first met in July 2006 after Cabinet directed 
An Indonesian fishing vessel is arrested in October 2005, during the height of the illegal fishing outbreak that preceded a review of the high-level 
management of the border security arrangements. Picture courtesy Australian Customs.
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the government’s overall policy objectives 
and oversees the implementation of maritime 
security programs.
Since all Australian Government departments 
on the Secretaries Committee of National 
Security (SCNS) are represented on the SMMC, 
SMMC can develop advice for Cabinet’s 
National Security Committee (NSC) through 
SCNS, which forms the NSC’s secretariat. 
SMMC is itself supported by the Joint 
Agencies Marine Advisory Group (chaired 
by Border Protection Command), to which a 
number of specialist working groups report. 
The introduction of those arrangements has 
gone some way to overcoming, at a strategic 
level, a persisting failure of the maritime 
border security arrangements, which was that 
they lacked a unifying command structure to 
establish objectives and achieve results.
Operational level control
At an operational level, Border Protection 
Command now provides a capacity for 
intelligence, operational planning and 
command that more fully integrates the 
civilian law enforcement and military 
counter-terrorism objectives of the 
arrangements. It was inaugurated under 
the title of the Joint Offshore Protection 
Command in March 2005, following the 
recommendations of the Taskforce on 
Offshore Maritime Security.
The taskforce’s principal objectives 
emphasised counter-terrorism and it 
identified legal ambiguity over the security 
of offshore oil and gas facilities as a major 
problem. The absence of integrated 
intelligence, that could allow an accurate 
assessment of all the activities in Australia’s 
maritime zones, was another.
The first problem has been addressed 
because, with the Australian Government 
now responsible for offshore facilities, BPC 
plans and manages periodic patrols of oil 
and gas facilities by naval and civil units. The 
second problem, related to the integration 
of intelligence, is being addressed by the 
development of the Australian Maritime 
Information System (AMIS), for which 
$79.5 million over four years was allocated 
in the 2007–08 Budget. The AMIS, which 
seeks to draw information from a variety 
of sources to identify the position and 
nature of vessels within 1,000 nm of the 
Australian coast, is well advanced in its 
development. Amendments to legislation in 
September 2007 now allow the AMSA to pass 
information on the position of ships and their 
characteristics to AMIS.
The AMIS, which seeks to draw 
information from a variety of sources 
to identify the position and nature 
of vessels within 1,000 nm of the 
Australian coast, is well advanced in 
its development. 
The Commander BPC continues to exercise 
the former role of Director-General 
Coastwatch, in charge of integrating 
surveillance, response and interception 
activities to meet the range of needs of 
Commonwealth and state agencies in 
Australia’s maritime zones. The authority 
of the Commander to deploy ADF assets 
assigned to him and to direct civilian 
assets under the control of the ACS was 
re-emphasised during the change of name to 
Border Protection Command in October 2006.
Although terrorism might expose maritime 
security to the most serious range of 
consequences, the normal range of unlawful, 
dangerous or unannounced activities 
continues to provide the bulk of BPC’s 
workload. As well as terrorism, the BPC 
Intelligence Centre focuses on illegal fishing in 
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vessels. The major fleet unit continues to 
support Operation Resolute, which, under the 
HQJOC, now combines the ongoing elements 
of the various ADF operations supporting 
civil maritime security, including Operation 
Relex, which began at the time of the Tampa 
incident in 2001.
All Armidale patrol boats are now operational, 
performing well and able to operate in a 
greater range of sea conditions than their 
predecessors. The commercially provided 
maintenance and logistic support has 
developed to meet fleet needs and crews are 
enjoying greater predictability of working 
life as a result of the multi-crewing practice, 
which provides roughly one and a half crew 
for each vessel. The ADF also contributes 
240 days of Regional Force Surveillance Unit 
time to patrolling the littoral and, particularly 
in the Torres Strait, offshore islands.
The ACVs were modified during 
2005 to mount two 7.62 mm 
general‑purpose machine guns at a 
cost of $1 million, in response to some 
instances of aggression from the 
crews of illegal foreign fishing vessels.
However, a substantial proportion of the sea 
time for maritime security is supplied by the 
Customs Marine Unit (CMU), which operates 
eight Bay Class Australian Customs vessels 
(ACV), which were delivered in 1999 and 
provide a total of 2,400 sea days per year. The 
CMU is staffed by Customs officers but its 
vessels are supported and maintained under 
contract. The ACVs were modified during 
2005 to mount two 7.62 mm general-purpose 
machine guns at a cost of $1 million, in 
response to some instances of aggression 
from the crews of illegal foreign fishing 
vessels. At the same time, an additional 
thirty-six customs officers were recruited, 
northern waters and the Southern Ocean and 
on unauthorised maritime arrivals. There has 
been an improvement in intelligence provided 
to the BPC by client agencies (who retain 
the task of providing risk assessment and 
threat identification reports for their areas 
of responsibility) with the acceptance of 
standardised procedures for risk assessment 
reporting. The continuing importance of 
fisheries and quarantine management has 
seen four officers, two each from AFMA and 
AQIS, embedded within the BPC operational 
hub, the National Surveillance Centre.
The Chief of Navy now force‑assigns 
naval vessels through the 
Headquarters Joint Operational 
Command to the operational 
control of the Commander BPC as 
Commander Joint Task Force 639.
Marine resources
The BPC has no equipment of its own for 
surveillance and response operations and calls 
on assets controlled by the ADF, Customs, 
AMSA and, occasionally, other agencies to 
provide it with an operational capacity. The 
Chief of Navy now force-assigns naval vessels 
through the Headquarters Joint Operational 
Command (HQJOC) to the operational control 
of the Commander BPC as Commander Joint 
Task Force 639. This arrangement provides 
for more efficient deployment of resources 
than the previous, more generalised, 
allocation of a nominated number of ship 
days.4 Those forces generally comprise seven 
Armidale Class patrol boats, a major fleet 
unit (the hydrographic ship HMAS Leeuwin 
in April 2008) and a landing craft. In 2007 a 
mine hunter was assigned after $95.6 million 
was allocated in the 2006–07 Budget to 
reactivate these craft as a measure to increase 
the capacity to respond to illegal fishing 
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later transfer to shore and is contracted to 
provide 100 days a year. Both vessels had been 
modified to mount a pair of 0.5 calibre guns.
Under a four-year, $31.7 million initiative in 
the 2007–08 Budget, the Ashmore Guardian 
was chartered and located at the Ashmore 
Reef and Cartier Islands marine reserves 
in April 2008 to monitor illegal foreign 
fishing and other unlawful activities. It is 
intended that the vessel remain in the area 
for 330 days a year, allowing officers to 
monitor developments in the region using 
two fast boats carried on board. Because of 
the upsurge of illegal foreign fishing activity 
in 2005–06, Customs commissioned four 
12-metre launches as Customs Response 
Vessels (CRV) from July 2007. Designated 
the River class, they are stationed in Darwin, 
Thursday Island, Gove and Weipa to transfer 
illegal fishermen to shore. In addition, 
twenty private vessels were contracted from 
at a cost of $20 million over four years, to 
increase the crew size to accommodate 
machine-gun operations.
The CMU manages vessels under commercial 
contract to the ACS to perform specific 
operational roles. They carry Customs officers 
(and officials of other client agencies) but are 
crewed by contractor staff and commercially 
maintained and supported. The largest of 
these vessels is the Oceanic Viking, formerly 
a cable laying ship, contracted to provide 
200 days a year5 for Southern Ocean patrols.
In January 2007 ACV Triton, formerly a Royal 
Navy research vessel, with an experimental 
trimaran hull form and capable of carrying 
twenty-eight Customs Maritime Enforcement 
Officers, commenced a contract to support 
operations against illegal foreign fishing 
off northwest Australia. She has supported 
operations by patrol boats and other fleet 
units by holding detained fishermen for 
The two large vessels under charter to the Customs Marine Unit are armed with 0.5 calibre guns operated by Customs Maritime Enforcement Officers, 
while the vessels have commercial crews. Here, Oceanic Viking stands by while FV Taruman is boarded off Macquarie Island.  
Picture courtesy Australian Customs.
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contracted for search and rescue missions. 
Since 2001–02 the RAAF has exceeded its 
nominal contribution of 250 hours per year 
by a factor of four or greater and, during 
the surveillance of the Japanese whaling 
fleet in Antarctic waters in January, several 
surveillance flights were undertaken by the 
Australian Antarctic Division’s A320 supply 
aircraft. The BPC also has contracts for 
satellite data, and covered 7.5 million square 
nautical miles with this form of surveillance 
during 2006–07.
… during the surveillance of the 
Japanese whaling fleet in Antarctic 
waters in January, several surveillance 
flights were undertaken by the 
Australian Antarctic Division’s A320 
supply aircraft.
Nonetheless, some of the less conventional 
forms of surveillance trialled for Project 
Sentinel have not come to fruition. Surface 
wave radar proved to have poor productivity 
because of its high logistics support 
requirements and no company responding 
to a tender (released in August 2006) for 
a midrange unmanned aerial vehicle fully 
met the tender conditions. Although trials 
for unmanned aerial vehicles were approved 
in May 2007, possible implementation of 
these systems is still some way off. Manned 
aircraft, albeit with increasingly sophisticated 
systems, remain the most cost-effective 
means of providing the awareness needed for 
managing Australia’s maritime zones.
Interagency coordination
Client agencies are satisfied both with the 
conduct of operations provided to meet 
their responsibilities and with the process 
used to plan strategic approaches to 
their requirements.6 Several key agencies 
2006–07 to stand by to tow foreign fishing 
vessels or transport their crews.
Since 1999 aerial surveillance capacity 
has been increased incrementally, 
by ad hoc budgetary supplements, 
from about 14,500 flying hours to 
21,000 flying hours in 2006–07.
Aerial surveillance
The aerial surveillance capability supporting 
Australia’s maritime security arrangements 
has recently been upgraded considerably. 
Since 1999 aerial surveillance capacity has 
been increased incrementally, by ad hoc 
budgetary supplements, from about 
14,500 flying hours to 21,000 flying hours 
in 2006–07. The service has been renewed 
on a long-term basis under Project Sentinel 
through a $1 billion contract with Surveillance 
Australia (SAPL) to provide surveillance for the 
next twelve years.
For the first time, the Coastwatch aerial fleet 
will be standardised, with the smaller, more 
simply equipped aircraft being abandoned. 
SAPL now operates ten Dash 8 aircraft, four 
of which are the more recent 315 series. 
All have updated sensors but the major 
advance is the installation of a surveillance 
information management (SIM) system that 
integrates surveillance data and uses satellite 
communications to provide a direct data feed 
to the National Surveillance Centre. The SIM 
provides a communications capability not 
provided in the RAAF’s AP-3C aircraft, which 
were delivered as recently as 2002. More 
importantly, it incorporates a data recording 
system developed specifically to maintain the 
evidentiary trail to support legal proceedings.
Additional flying hours are provided by 
tasking AMSA’s fleet of five Dornier aircraft, 
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those risks. It was possible to achieve better 
quarantine security by burning the boats 
at sea7 and accommodating their crews 
elsewhere until they could be repatriated.
Improvements to BPC’s capacity 
have been important but, as all 
agencies recognise, maritime 
enforcement operations deal with 
the consequences of fundamental 
problems that lie elsewhere.
Arrangements were made with the ACS 
to provide temporary accommodation at 
designated reception points and transport for 
those sufficiently fit to travel. Immigration 
now holds foreign fishermen, usually in their 
centre at Darwin, to verify their details and 
provide repatriation. With the adoption of 
the new operational procedures, sightings 
of illegal fishing boats in Australian waters 
fell by 58% in 2006–07. Vessels that may be 
considered that the system had improved 
markedly since 2005 and were satisfied 
with the determination of priorities through 
the SMMC process. Additional funding has 
allowed several of them to change their 
procedures. For example, AFMA now has more 
operational staff based in regional Australia, 
including in Northern Command.
All agencies considered that the 
arrangements were now more streamlined 
and better coordinated and were yielding 
benefits. For instance, a breakthrough in 
reducing the level of illegal foreign fishing was 
achieved when operational procedures were 
modified to more fully reflect the concerns 
of AQIS. The generally old and dilapidated 
wooden fishing boats (potentially harbouring 
marine organisms, insect larvae and human 
pathogens) that dominate illegal fishing in 
northern waters pose severe quarantine 
risks. The practice of towing the boats to 
Darwin Harbour and mooring them there 
to accommodate the crew during legal 
proceedings did not adequately address 
An initiative to control illegal foreign fishing in the north has been the introduction of joint Australian–Indonesian fisheries patrols. Here ACV Arnhem Bay 
and the Hiu Macan 003 patrol the conjunction of the fishing zones in November 2007. Picture courtesy Australian Customs.
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fishing vessels in 2007–08 returning to their 
usual level.
Participating agencies are concerned that 
future maritime border security arrangements 
do not reduce the flexibility and coordination 
built up over the past two years. This relates 
to the need for continued efficiency of 
operations in meeting agency goals and for 
agencies to have the flexibility to engage 
the maritime border security arrangements 
through the procedures that best suit their 
needs. DIAC finds most value in entering 
the arrangements through the People 
Smuggling Task Force, now a well-established 
interdepartmental committee, while AMSA 
finds most value in utilising its relationships 
with state agencies, since the majority of 
search and rescue operations involve police 
forces or emergency medical resources.
The ghosts of history: lessons for 
the development of maritime 
border security arrangements
The arrangements for securing Australia’s 
maritime zones have developed over time 
through a series of incremental responses 
to crises that seemed to expose a weakness 
in the existing arrangements. Usually, the 
‘crisis’ was defined by the strength of the 
political reaction generated and the ‘solutions’ 
marked by a distinct unwillingness to invest 
in creating longer term capacity. This process 
of ‘crisis-driven incrementalism’ has marked 
the maritime security arrangements for 
decades. During this period, several incidents 
highlighted important principles that should 
be part of Australia’s future maritime security.
Although changes to fishing jurisdictions 
drew the Commonwealth into maritime 
border security in the late 1960s, it was 
concern over quarantine issues that prompted 
the first major public awareness of civil 
maritime security in the early 1970s. However, 
infringing the AFZ are now usually found at 
the edge of the 200 nm zone.
Improvements to BPC’s capacity have been 
important but, as all agencies recognise, 
maritime enforcement operations deal with 
the consequences of fundamental problems 
that lie elsewhere. The Department of 
Immigration and Citizenship (DIAC) attempts 
to control people smuggling by focusing on 
intelligence and ameliorative programs in 
host country refugee camps and considers 
the capacity of the maritime arrangements 
to apprehend smugglers’ boats as security 
to cover possible systemic malfunctions. 
A similar approach has been adopted in 
response to the increase in illegal fishing. 
The government allocated $389 million 
in the 2006–07 Budget to cover a range 
of initiatives, including programs in the 
fishermen’s home communities.
Participating agencies are concerned 
that future maritime border security 
arrangements do not reduce the 
flexibility and coordination built up 
over the past two years.
One measure was to assist Indonesia to 
deal with its illegal fishing problems, as 
much unsustainable activity in its waters 
results from commercial activities that are 
often foreign sourced. Cooperation with 
Indonesian authorities was explored at the 
Australia–Indonesia Fisheries Surveillance 
Forum in February 2007 and results emerged 
in October 2007. In a coordinated operation 
supported by a Coastwatch aircraft, the ACV 
Arnhem Bay and two Indonesian Fisheries 
Department vessels patrolled their respective 
sides of the maritime border in the Arafura 
Sea for four days. The measures have 
contributed to apprehensions of illegal foreign 
Strategic Insights 15
Attempts to introduce central control
These initiatives were implemented very 
slowly and it was not long before surveillance 
and enforcement agencies were being 
criticised for their lack of flexibility. The 
metronomically regular standing patrols of 
the coastline, developed to meet quarantine 
requirements, were deemed inappropriate 
as public attention was drawn to the control 
of illegally imported drugs.9 The Minister 
for Aviation in the Hawke government, Kim 
Beazley, reviewed the arrangements in 1983 
and concluded they were flawed because 
there was a separation of responsibility for 
conducting surveillance operations and 
for conducting response and enforcement. 
Surveillance operations were largely under 
the control of the Transport and Defence 
departments and response and enforcement 
operations lay with a number of different 
agencies. As a consequence, there was no 
broad oversight of operations and their 
management did not consider the range of 
national interests that should be addressed 
by the maritime security arrangements.
The Beazley review established central 
control of maritime surveillance, to align and 
apply priorities to the national objectives, 
by transferring it to a Coastal Protection 
Unit (CPU) within the Australian Federal 
Police. Yet funding for maritime surveillance 
activities continued to be allocated to 
individual agencies and the general 
adoption of ‘user pays’ principles by the 
government meant that the better-funded 
agencies continued to determine the 
nature of operations. The CPU never 
established effective control of the maritime 
security program.
The consequences were demonstrated within 
three years. In 1987 an underfunded and 
inexperienced bidder, Amman Aviation, won 
the contract to provide the littoral surveillance 
flights but was unable to commence 
operations. An enquiry found the contract 
a compelling requirement to establish civil 
maritime surveillance emerged during the 
United Nations Law of the Sea Conference 
and in 1978 the government declared that 
it would establish an Australia Exclusive 
Economic Zone. The advent of Vietnamese 
boatpeople at around the same time gave 
political impetus to demands that Australia 
create the capacity to monitor and manage 
its maritime claims.
This process of ‘crisis‑driven 
incrementalism’ has marked the 
maritime security arrangements 
for decades.
The Fraser government declined to establish 
a new agency for this purpose, and decided to 
contract commercial air operators to provide 
the bulk of surveillance services. Because 
quarantine was seen as the major security 
risk, funding was allocated to AQIS, but 
because the Department of Transport ran the 
Aviation Coordination and Rescue Centre and 
thus had the capacity to plot air movements 
around many areas of Australia it was given 
responsibility for managing operations. 
Those arrangements established some of 
the characteristics still apparent in Australian 
maritime border security: appending 
responsibility for conducting operations 
to whatever agency appeared the ‘best fit’ 
(that is, an existing government agency 
that already performed functions similar 
to those required), dividing responsibilities 
between operating and client agencies, 
and avoiding long-term commitments of 
resources. As the Minister for Transport at 
the time said, ‘the measures adopted at this 
stage have been designed to provide a high 
degree of flexibility without commitments to 
capital expenditure.’8
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and not for the first time, the government 
declined to establish a dedicated agency for 
maritime border security and transferred 
management of the CPU’s functions to the 
ACS. This time, however, control of the budget 
was transferred to the ACS and the basis of 
the arrangements as they now exist was laid.
The Hudson model worked in streamlining 
the management of maritime surveillance, 
increasing its capacity and improving 
flexibility. Nevertheless, some endemic 
weaknesses persisted. Many of those 
weaknesses concerned communications. 
For more than a decade communications 
between surveillance aircraft and patrol 
boats around the north of Australia 
remained difficult because neither had 
satellite communications. A Customs 
proposal to establish a national surveillance 
centre as an integrated command and 
control system, planned for inclusion in the 
1997–98 Budget, was deferred. In 1998 the 
ACS was restructured and, ignoring the 1988 
administrative arrangements, absorbed 
Coastwatch into its border management 
subprogram. Two senior management 
positions created to enable Coastwatch to 
function semiautonomously were abolished. 
Coastwatch was now a subsidiary part 
of an organisation that was one of its 
largest clients.
Those problems were not rectified until 
the intervention of the Prime Minister’s 
Coastal Surveillance Taskforce, formed after 
undetected people smuggling incursions 
on the beach north of Cairns in March 1999 
and at Nambucca Heads in April 1999. The 
taskforce recommended a significant increase 
in resources, including the provision of 
secure satellite communications, improved 
communications and data processing 
capacity between Coastwatch and other 
organisations and the establishment of the 
previously delayed National Surveillance 
Centre. Significantly, it re-established the 
had been awarded inappropriately because 
of an overemphasis on cost reduction by the 
Department of Transport. Although Transport 
still managed the aerial capacity, it had 
minimal interest in meeting the objectives of 
the surveillance system.10 There was little time 
to consider the implications of the findings 
because, in December 1987, the Department 
of Primary Industries and Energy decided it 
would discontinue aerial littoral surveillance in 
favour of more direct surface operations. With 
ADF flying now significantly reduced, the 
system faced collapse and the government 
was forced into a fundamental rethink.
Hugh Hudson argued that the role of 
the surveillance system was to meet 
national law enforcement goals …
The origins of the current system
Northern Approaches, the subsequent report 
by Hugh Hudson, noted that, while civil 
surveillance flights were funded against 
quarantine requirements, the operational 
priority at the time was for flights further 
out to sea to monitor an increasing level of 
unlawful Indonesian fishing. He argued that 
the role of the surveillance system was to 
meet national law enforcement goals and that 
priorities and individual operations should 
not be subject to a de facto financial veto 
by whichever agency held funding. Further, 
appropriating funds to individual agencies 
had allowed national goals to be ignored to 
such an extent that Hudson feared Australia 
could not meet its responsibilities under 
the UNCLOS regime. Neither did it provide 
adequate security in the Torres Strait area.11
Hudson recommended that an Australian 
maritime safety and coastwatch agency 
be established (combining surveillance and 
search and rescue functions) and that it report 
directly to the appropriate minister. Instead, 
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of this policy change was to make the border 
protection arrangements, and most of the 
assets supporting them, irrelevant.
Consequently, ADF assets, under Operation 
Relex, had to be used, at huge expense 
and inconvenience, to implement the 
government’s new policy. Before this the 
maritime security arrangements had cost 
around $244 million. During the year following 
the Tampa incident, a full assessment of the 
opportunity cost of using ADF assets would 
suggest that something like $535 million 
was devoted to the removal of unlawful 
immigrants, noting that this amount does 
not include the immigration-related expenses 
of maintaining detainees away from the 
Australian mainland.12
At the same time, other agencies such as 
AFMA found there was little capacity to 
assist them to meet their responsibilities. It 
was to take several years, and a refocusing 
on illegal fishing in 2005, before balance in 
the maritime security arrangements was 
re-established.
Some doubt also exists as to whether 
the current structure can fully support 
the robust development of maritime 
security arrangements into the future.
Improved arrangements for 
maritime border security
There have been significant developments 
in maritime border security arrangements 
over the past few years and these should 
be preserved. Improved strategic direction, 
effective operational control and integration 
of agency objectives into the arrangements 
provide a good basis for continuing 
surveillance and maritime enforcement 
operations for the immediate future. 
However, because those developments have 
semiautonomous position of Coastwatch 
by appointing an ADF officer, with rank 
equivalent to Rear Admiral, as Director 
General of Coastwatch, reporting directly to 
the CEO of the ACS.
Twice within little more than a 
decade, political pressure had been 
necessary to produce a policy response 
after inertia in public administration 
had prevented the resolution of 
persisting problems …
Twice within little more than a decade, 
political pressure had been necessary to 
produce a policy response after inertia in 
public administration had prevented the 
resolution of persisting problems with 
the maritime security arrangements. 
Unfortunately, the focus of the Prime 
Minister’s Taskforce was short lived and 
there was little opportunity for broader 
integration of maritime security objectives 
and procedures before another political crisis 
brought further confusion to the maritime 
security arrangements.
In the financial year following the 
taskforce’s report in July 1999, people 
smuggling increased fourfold, to more than 
4,000 landings off the northwest coast, 
mostly on offshore territories such as the 
Ashmore and Cartier reefs. The arrangements 
were adapted by increasing the presence of 
Commonwealth officials on the inhospitable 
reefs and gathering individuals for transport 
to the mainland by chartered ferry for 
immigration processing. However, this process 
was turned on its head in August 2001 when, 
following the ‘Tampa incident’, the Howard 
government decided the unlawful immigrants 
should be denied access to Australia’s legal 
system by preventing them reaching the 
Australian mainland. The immediate impact 
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future. Inevitably, operational agencies must 
adjust to changing circumstances and alter 
roles, procedures, training and equipment if 
they are to remain effective. They establish 
planning procedures to make changes 
before they are overtaken by events. The 
ADF is practised in this and has established 
a process for developing the future 
capabilities of the Force that includes analysis 
of the implications of changing strategic 
circumstances, development of concepts of 
how best to operate in these circumstances 
and identification of the types of equipment 
that will support such operations. 
BPC’s position in the maritime security 
arrangements has not been formally 
secured and it does not control the 
provision of the equipment and 
personnel that will fulfil the concepts 
it develops.
Former ADF personnel now employed by the 
ACS and located in BPC have been applying 
this methodology to identifying the future 
direction of maritime border security. They 
have conducted trials and evaluation of 
technology with the assistance of a Defence 
Science and Technology Organisation (DSTO) 
officer seconded to the BPC. A ‘future 
operating concept’ is being prepared to 
identify how BPC capability should be 
developed up to 2015. Those activities should 
eliminate the cycle of ad hoc reactions to 
emerging crises that characterised the 
development of the maritime security 
arrangements until recently. It will also 
support more effective financial planning by 
allowing longer-range identification of capital 
and recurring financial implications.
The significant risk to the successful 
implementation of these procedures is that 
BPC does not appear to be best placed to 
been made by administrative arrangement, 
the basis of the recent progress has not 
been consolidated. It appears that more 
substantial changes are needed to preserve 
those developments. Some doubt also exists 
as to whether the current structure can fully 
support the robust development of maritime 
security arrangements into the future. 
The strategic policy role of SMMC provides 
a basis for forward planning as well as for 
setting priorities for forthcoming operations. 
Indeed, the extended consultative model 
used by SMMC, its clear communication to 
Cabinet’s NSC and its supporting structure, 
have provided a useful operational trial of 
processes relevant to the government’s 
election policy to establish an Office of 
National Security under a National Security 
Advisor. With the SMMC, the higher-level 
strategic processes to support effective and 
cost-efficient maritime security are now 
broadly in place.
The directives accompanying the change 
of name to Border Protection Command 
in October 2006 appear to have redressed 
what was perhaps a too heavy emphasis 
on counter-terrorism and clarified, if it was 
necessary, the primacy of the Commander 
BPC in coordinating the civil and military 
contributions to civil maritime border security. 
With the capacity to directly manage HQJOC 
assigned ADF units and direct allocated ACS 
resources, the BPC now provides a unified 
direction of operations that was missing 
during most of Australia’s previous attempts 
to provide maritime security. The model that 
now exists is one of an operational agency 
acting within strategic guidance and that is 
responsive to, and practiced in meeting the 
needs of, client agencies.
Management developments for the future
While those processes support current 
operations, they are not ideally suited to 
supporting the arrangements into the 
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Yet there appears to be no necessary reason 
why enforcement of Australian law on water 
should vary significantly from enforcement 
on land and should not be the responsibility 
of a dedicated agency. To achieve the goal 
of a dedicated agency and to ensure that 
Australia’s maritime security arrangements 
retain the capacity to deal with current 
threats and adjust to future developments, 
BPC should be established as a statutory 
authority by legislation. Such legislation 
could initially build on BPC’s current roles 
and relationships. However, it would aim to 
reinforce BPC’s current position in operations 
and improve its potential for future 
development by making it directly responsible 
to an appropriate minister for intelligence 
collation and assessment, for operational 
planning and implementation and for future 
capability development. 
… the majority of resources used for 
that enforcement come from civil 
sources because of their cultural 
and legal appropriateness, cost 
efficiency and access to a more varied 
labour market.
Since many of these functions would continue 
to make heavy use of Defence resources, 
an appropriate portfolio for the authority 
might be that of Defence with responsibility 
given to a minister assisting. However, the 
major objective of the maritime security 
arrangements is enforcement of civil law, 
even though the ADF may take the lead 
for offshore counter-terrorism. Similarly, 
the majority of resources used for that 
enforcement come from civil sources because 
of their cultural and legal appropriateness, 
cost efficiency and access to a more varied 
labour market. Thus a more appropriate 
minister would appear to be the minister 
ensure that they are implemented effectively: 
BPC’s position in the maritime security 
arrangements has not been formally secured 
and it does not control the provision of the 
equipment and personnel that will fulfil the 
concepts it develops.
The need for a statutory basis
The authority of the Commander BPC rests 
upon directives issued jointly by the Chief of 
the Defence Force and the CEO of Customs. 
In its nature, this situation is little different 
from the position of Coastwatch when it was 
first located within the ACS. Following the 
restructure of Customs in 2007, the BPC now 
sits within the Border Enforcement Program 
(managed by a Customs Deputy CEO) 
alongside the Maritime Operations Support 
Division that supplies the non-military assets 
used by BPC for the conduct of its operations.
The current heightened awareness of 
maritime security means that those 
administrative arrangements should 
not impede the development of future 
capabilities. However, history suggests that 
as this awareness fades there is a real danger 
that peoples’ understanding of objectives 
will be lost and the maintenance of capacity, 
let alone its future development, will be 
overtaken by the inertia of dealing with 
current problems. A factor contributing 
to many of the problems that have arisen 
with the maritime security arrangements 
is that there never has been a minister 
with the responsibility for their effective 
implementation. This has not been a 
consequence of the complexity of the 
legislative environment but of a desire 
to avoid the creation of a central body 
responsible for enforcement. Repeated earlier 
crises were seen as systemic failures by 
operators but not by policymakers and, for 
this reason, repairing the damage has always 
been seconded to committees, taskforces and 
commissioned reports.
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for maritime border security. Further, loss of 
the joint command may compromise the use 
of civil assets, such as the ACVs, that have 
been a part of counter-terrorism prevention 
measures around offshore installations. 
Doubts about the legal validity of the joint 
command and control structure of the BPC 
have been considered by experienced legal 
opinion to not infringe the requirements of 
the Defence Act but rather assist the making 
of both lawful and decisive judgments in 
offshore enforcement.13
The creation of a dedicated authority for 
maritime security may seem merely cosmetic. 
In fact, the value of political leadership in 
implementing policy is reinforced by the 
example of the SMMC. In principle, this 
differs little from the Planning Advisory 
Sub-Committee and Operational Program 
Advisory Committee that previously 
developed objectives and three-monthly 
programs for maritime surveillance and 
marine operations. However, supported by 
Cabinet, the SMMC appears to have had 
more success in less than two years than had 
been achieved in previous decades. History 
indicates that the attention of Cabinet seldom 
stays fixed for long while that of ministers is 
more enduring.
Improved procedures and practices
The nature of the new authority should be 
largely that of the current BPC but, once 
freed from the confines of the ACS structure, 
it might be expected to develop a character 
more reflective of the maritime domain. 
This would include drawing more heavily on 
defence concepts, expertise and relationships 
and transferring more of the relevant aspects 
to the civil organisation than might be 
possible under the constraints of a major 
department. The roles and volume of work 
performed by Customs indicates that BPC 
occupies a small part of its responsibilities, 
even if the ACS does have a consistent and 
responsible for both the AFP and Customs 
(if that conjunction is retained). This would 
ensure consistency in portfolio objectives 
focused on law enforcement and operating 
in a like environment, including appropriate 
arrangements for the effective use of 
classified intelligence.
Conduct of the arrangements nonetheless 
will continue to require an extensive use of 
ADF equipment, personnel and resources. 
However, the authority would not be able 
to take over Defence assets allocated to the 
support of maritime security arrangements. 
Section 9 of the Defence Act 1903 requires 
command of the ADF be exercised by the 
Chief of the Defence Force. There appears 
to be no such prohibition on a serving ADF 
officer heading a civilian organisation. Hence, 
the appropriate leadership of the authority 
would lie, as at present, with a two star ADF 
officer, responsible to the minister for the 
conduct of civil operations and the provision 
of civil capabilities, and commanded by the 
CDF, through agreed arrangements, for the 
management of ADF assets and assistance to 
counter-terrorism operations. 
This arrangement is similar to those now 
current but improves responsiveness as it 
allows direct ministerial access for authority 
management and facilitates the development 
of maritime security initiatives across the 
constraints of portfolio boundaries. The 
SMMC constitutes an appropriate mechanism 
for facilitating arrangements between 
departments and seeking Cabinet approval.
The development of the BPC has provided 
unity of command in the implementation 
of maritime security arrangements, an 
important element that had previously been 
missing. This successful command structure 
would be put at risk if such arrangements 
were not replicated in the new agency. The 
outcome would be an organisation that 
could, in effect, only develop policy advice 
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report stated that because the NMU had 
not produced an asset plan or strategy, its 
evaluation of options to replace its ACVs 
would be difficult. Financial planning also 
would be hampered because the NMU 
could not produce life-cycle costing data. 
Such management tools are used routinely 
in the Defence organisation. The report 
also noted that because the first of the 
ACVs would reach its half-life in 2004 
and could be decommissioned as early as 
2009 consideration of the next class of 
Customs vessel was urgent. Among the 
issues that would have to be resolved were 
crew technical standards (the Bay Class had 
been restricted in length so that Customs 
seagoing crew would not need additional 
marine qualifications) and the restrictions on 
boarding capability and for covert operations 
inherent in the vessel’s design.14
The demise of NORCOM will 
necessitate a revision of procedures, 
as the Command controls operations 
against illegal use of the waters to the 
north and northwest of the continent.
Fundamental issues for decision
It is fortunate that several developments 
currently provide an opportunity to improve 
the maritime security arrangements. In 2009 
BPC and the Customs Maritime Operations 
Support Division will move from their 
accommodation in Customs House, Canberra, 
into larger and more suitable accommodation. 
The management of contracts for marine 
operations will be centralised as part of 
the change. At the same time, Customs is 
expecting progress in developing a program 
to replace the Bay class ACVs and the ADF is 
moving to disestablish NORCOM.
The demise of NORCOM will necessitate a 
revision of procedures and the command 
long-term interest in maritime operations. 
A branch of Customs supporting maritime 
security will likely remain a minor part of 
an organisation whose major focus has 
necessarily been on the dockside and 
whose major activities are investigation 
and compliance.
The current diffusion of responsibilities 
makes these issues ones that are both 
difficult to address and on which to 
produce definitive guidance.
A statutory BPC would be free to concentrate 
on the nature of the maritime environment 
and be more likely to develop a culture 
reflecting this. It would be well suited to 
answer questions that do not easily fit the 
present portfolio structure, such as how to 
engage the growing coast guard activity 
in Southeast Asia or consider the roles and 
responsibilities of civil maritime security 
forces in time of military tension or conflict. 
The current diffusion of responsibilities makes 
these issues ones that are both difficult to 
address and on which to produce definitive 
guidance. The statutory BPC would be an 
organisation able to monitor the maritime 
security environment and make timely 
recommendations to government rather 
than, as with the establishment of the BPC 
on the recommendation of the Task Force 
on Offshore Maritime Security, await the 
appointment of another committee.
A 2004 audit report on the Customs National 
Marine Unit (as it was then titled), gives 
some idea of the importance of differences 
between organisational cultures. The audit 
reported that client agencies of the NMU 
were ‘more than satisfied’ with the NMU’s 
performance. However, it identified some 
problems, mostly to do with the NMU’s 
capacity to generate future capability. The 
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proportion of the sea time used to enforce 
the maritime security arrangements and 
is involved across the range of operations, 
including counter-terrorism. Those factors 
emphasise Customs’ unique role in the 
maritime security arrangements: it is both a 
major client and a major resource provider.
Such issues are relevant to the replacement 
of Customs’ ACV fleet. The Bay class vessels 
were a considerable improvement on the 
Minister class that preceded them, reflecting 
the influence of the earlier vessels having 
been drawn into wider roles as the security 
arrangements developed. Nonetheless, as 
noted by the ANAO in its report, the Bay 
class suffer some shortcomings as a result 
of their design being restricted by Customs 
priorities, such as the limitation on length. 
Passing responsibility for the development 
of the next class of civilian patrol vessels to a 
BPC authority should ensure that the design 
will be optimised for national maritime 
control of operations against illegal use of 
the waters to the north and northwest of 
the continent. Its commanding officer is 
designated Deputy ADF Commander BPC and 
the importance of its role in countering illegal 
foreign fishing and people smuggling is such 
that the government will have to take advice 
and seek client agency responses on proposals 
for the reallocation of its functions. This is 
regardless of any intention to reconsider the 
broader aspects of the maritime security 
arrangements. The move also necessitates a 
reconsideration of the nature of the deputy 
command of the BPC.
The redevelopment of the Customs ACV 
fleet also requires consideration of some 
fundamental issues. The ACS has a maritime 
tradition stretching back to its origins and 
continues to have specific operational 
requirements that influence both the nature 
of its fleet and its operational program. 
Yet the ACV fleet provides a substantial 
The RAN considers that, at 57 metres in length, the Armidale class patrol boats are the right size for response work in Australia’s EEZ. This is 
HMAS Maryborough, last of the class of 14, commissioned in December 2007. © Department of Defence
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A statutory BPC could still find such future 
capability issues difficult. However, with a 
strong naval influence it would be likely to 
take a different approach to some major 
issues. A military-oriented organisation 
considers the training of personnel to be 
fundamental to its efficiency, and the minister 
could charge the statutory authority with 
responsibility for implementing training 
and development regimes for both the 
effectiveness of the maritime border 
arrangements and the concomitant benefits 
for national maritime development. Such a 
role would not be an appropriate objective 
for Customs.
It is hoped that current Customs Marine 
Enforcement Officers and other maritime 
staff will make the transition to the BPC 
authority but, in any case, most mariners 
in the organisation will be civilians. 
Recruitment of naval personnel is difficult 
and undertaking maritime training and 
development supports national objectives. 
The RAN is currently understaffed by around 
1,000 personnel and there is a shortage of 
some 60,000 international mariners, yet the 
Australian Shipowners Association notes that 
it cannot meet the demand from Australians 
for maritime training because of a lack of 
suitable berths. Because of the pervasiveness 
of skills shortages, developing procedures 
for training its own staff would be a primary 
responsibility of a statutory BPC, justified by 
its contribution to national skills development 
as much as by operational efficiency.
For reasons such as better surety of 
future capability development and deeper 
involvement in personnel training, it seems 
inevitable that there be a significant transfer 
of Customs Maritime Operations Support 
Division resources to a statutory BPC. Since 
much of Customs’ marine capability is 
provided by commercial operators under 
contract, the transfer of administrative 
security needs. Royal Australian Navy (RAN) 
experience with the Armidale class indicates 
that this should include a length of over 
50 metres.
Fundamentally, a decision on 
Customs’ place in the maritime 
arrangements is required before 
the development of the Bay class 
replacement …
Conversely, these criteria might produce a 
vessel that was inefficient if dedicated to 
ACS operations. Fundamentally, a decision on 
Customs’ place in the maritime arrangements 
is required before the development of 
the Bay class replacement, regardless of 
whether there is to be any reassessment of 
the arrangements themselves. Customs will 
continue to require a maritime capability, 
and assessing the divide between customs 
specific requirements and broader national 
needs seems to be central to ensuring that the 
Bay class replacement delivers a cost-effective 
enhancement of the maritime security 
arrangements.
The approach taken in this report would 
favour a BPC authority developing a design 
equivalent to a civilianised Armidale (or a 
repeat order if there were financial benefits). 
Capacity for major ACS tasks would then 
be allocated by BPC, as for any other client 
agency, with the ACS retaining its fleet 
of smaller boats for specific Customs 
requirements. The present issue, however, is 
not in the answer but that these questions 
need to be asked before the Bay class is 
replaced. This paper contends that the answer 
would better meet national considerations if 
it were supported by the work of a statutory 
BPC authority.
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This is that a statutory BPC should play a 
role in supporting marine research, primarily 
by providing vessel time. This would reflect 
another aspect of the naval approach, as 
navies have long accepted that knowledge 
of their working environment is important 
to success. It would formalise a process that 
has existed since AFMA first chartered the 
Southern Supporter and made space and time 
available for Commonwealth scientists to 
undertake work in the Southern Ocean. As on 
that initial occasion, combined research and 
patrol functions would justify an increase in 
operational time to the south of the continent 
sooner than might otherwise be acceptable. 
A model that could be followed is that of 
the Canadian Coast Guard, which operates 
vessels with a dual patrol and marine 
research function.
The question of nomenclature for a statutory 
BPC is one that will probably arise. The name 
‘Coastwatch’ has been used for several 
decades and is generally familiar. While 
‘Coastwatch’ appears on aircraft, ACS vessels 
carry the name ‘Customs’ and the title 
Border Protection Command now is used 
exclusively in public communications to avoid 
confusion. Unfortunately, ‘Border Protection 
Command’ is not an entirely instructive title. 
‘Coast Guard’ is a generally accepted term for 
organisations with a civil maritime security 
role. It covers bodies with vastly different 
structures and roles, from the highly complex, 
powerful and expensive US Coast Guard, 
through the Canadian version that more 
closely resembles Australia’s AMSA (except in 
its greatly larger size), to organisations similar 
in size and function to water police. The name 
Coast Guard could fairly be applied to an 
Australian statutory organisation for maritime 
security that controlled its own assets.
Objectives and costs
The changes recommended above are a 
logical extension of the improvements in 
components would need to include those 
elements responsible for contracting aerial 
and marine assets.
There are compelling reasons of 
efficiency for a BPC authority to retain 
the use of contractor services, which 
have generally worked effectively in 
providing surveillance and marine 
enforcement capabilities.
There are compelling reasons of efficiency 
for a BPC authority to retain the use of 
contractor services, which have generally 
worked effectively in providing surveillance 
and marine enforcement capabilities. There 
have, however, been spectacular failures to 
provide services or even to protect lives when 
contracts have been developed by agencies 
with no direct responsibilities for outcomes 
or experience of operational environments. It 
would therefore be a role for a BPC authority 
to develop, issue and manage all contracts 
to provide Commonwealth capabilities for 
maritime border security.
The authority’s direct responsibility to a 
minister should go some way to ensuring 
contracts are drafted to prevent incidents 
such as happened in January 2008 when ACV 
Triton remained moored in Darwin Harbour, 
unavailable because its civilian crew were on 
strike as a result of the contractor’s attempt 
to change the basis of their employment.
With such a structure in place, the exact 
nature of capability transfers from 
Customs is an issue that can be left to the 
developmental processes of a BPC authority, 
guided by the strategic settings generated 
through the SMMC.
There is, however, one area of activity that 
might be mandated, as it falls outside the 
normal remit of maritime border security. 
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painless relocation of the new statutory 
authority. The contemporaneous move of 
important ACS functions should make the 
establishment of the new organisation easier. 
There may be some delays, especially in 
recruiting skilled staff. However, this risk could 
be managed by delaying the full transfer of 
operational capabilities until the replacement 
for the Bay class is phased in and by 
coordinating the timing of training programs.
In present circumstances the cost of the 
proposed changes to the maritime security 
arrangements should not be great. There will 
be start-up costs for the new organisation 
and some costs for a degree of reorganisation 
within the ACS. There will be an inevitable 
increase in personnel costs to flesh out 
the BPC organisation, particularly if the 
government accepts that its role includes an 
employee skills training program. There will be 
no requirement for capital expenditure until 
the replacement of the Bay class and this is a 
cost that is already anticipated. Unless there 
is an unexpected upsurge in illegal maritime 
activity there should be no need for budget 
initiatives such as the $388.9 million allocated 
in 2006–07 to fight illegal fishing or the 
$79.5 million in 2007–08 for the development 
of the AMIS over four years.
The changes proposed in this report are 
important for ensuring that the intent of 
recent improvements is carried forward and 
that there is an improved capacity to build 
upon them to provide future capability. 
With these changes in place, the capacity 
will exist to develop an organisation that 
provides effective civil control of Australia’s 
maritime zones by utilising best practice in 
relevant naval personnel, developmental 
and organisational fields in a civilian 
organisation that incorporates the efficiency 
of commercially provided assets with its own 
sense of purpose.
strategic guidance and operational control 
introduced to the Australian maritime 
security arrangements over the past few 
years. They are not intended to see immediate 
increases in the quantum of activity in either 
surveillance or enforcement operations. The 
contract with SAPL for aerial surveillance is 
nearing full implementation and provides 
a significant increase in capability. The last 
of the RAN’s Armidale patrol boats, which 
provide a superior capability to that of their 
predecessors, was delivered in 2007. The 
development of the AMIS promises to allow 
more effective use of such resources.
The principal aim of the changes 
suggested in this paper is to ensure that 
these improvements are entrenched and 
further developed. Despite the attention 
usually paid to operational capabilities, 
the effectiveness of their deployment has 
more often been improved by significant 
changes to the structure of the maritime 
security arrangements. Further progress 
will depend on continuing such structural 
reform. With a statutory authority able to 
focus on the complete range of maritime 
law enforcement issues it should be possible 
to replace the Bay class ACVs with vessels 
that provide the optimal improvement in 
national security performance; provide more 
Southern Ocean patrol days in conjunction 
with increased maritime research; and 
assist the development of Australia’s marine 
skills base through agency training and 
development programs.
Establishing a new basis for the maritime 
security arrangements carries the risk of 
discontinuities in operational deployments 
and management of key functions 
through the transitional phase. In current 
circumstances, however, these risks can be 
reduced by matching organisational changes 
to the developments that are already planned 
or projected. The transfer of BPC to new 
accommodation allows for the relatively 
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8 Peter Nixon, Minister for Transport, 
‘Australian Civil Coastal Surveillance’, Press 
Statement, Canberra, 9 July 1978.
9 The most prominent criticisms of the 
conduct of surveillance operations 
were contained in the Australian Royal 
Commission of Inquiry into Drugs (Williams 
Report) of 1980 and, later, the Royal 
Commission of Inquiry into Drug Trafficking 
(Stewart Report) of 1983.
10 A C Menzies, Review of Tender Processes 
For the Transport Contract, Final Report, 
Canberra, November 1987. Indeed, 
Menzies commented that no agency had 
sufficient stake in the effectiveness of the 
surveillance system to ensure a workable 
outcome: Menzies, pp. 70 ff.
11 By 1988 civil flying hours were down 
56% and military surveillance was less 
than 30% of the level introduced a 
decade earlier.
12 These estimates are an attempt to 
identify the opportunity cost of diverting 
ADF units from their normal activities; 
the government used a budget-based 
method of identifying the additional cost 
to revenue of the operation. For more 
detail see Derek Woolner, ‘Australia’s 
Border Protection Regime’, in Martin 
Tsamenyi and Chris Rahman (eds.), 
Protecting Australia’s Maritime Borders: 
The MV Tampa and Beyond, University of 
Wollongong, 2002.
13 Cameron Moore, ‘Turning King Canute into 
Lord Neptune: Australia’s new offshore 
protection measures’, University of New 
England Law Journal, 3(1), June 2006, 
pp. 68–71.
14 For a discussion of the issues surrounding 
the replacement of the Bay class ACV see; 
Australian National Audit Office, National 
Marine Unit Australian Customs Service, 
Audit Report No. 37 2003–04, Canberra 
2004, pp. 88–90.
Endnotes
1 Recognition of these claims was granted 
by the UN Commission on the Limits of 
the Continental Shelf. The Hon. Martin 
Ferguson, Minister for Resources and 
Energy, Media Release, 21 April 2008.
2 Bureau of Transport and Regional 
Economics, Australian Transport Statistics 
2007, Table 16 ‘Summary of Australian 
shipping activity’, Canberra, June 2007, 
p. 20.
3 From 1997–98 until 2000–01 
apprehensions and legislative forfeitures 
of foreign fishing boats working illegally 
in Australian waters remained at around 
100 per year. In 2001–02 numbers 
began to creep upward, with 367 vessels 
eventually detained in 2005–06, indicating 
a significant change in the nature of the 
illegal fishing threat.
4 This was generally 1,800 patrol boat days. 
The assignment of half the Armidale patrol 
boat fleet to BPC represents an equivalent 
amount of the predicted annual output of 
the new patrol boat fleet. The allocation of 
other assets has developed in response to 
specific peaks in workload associated with 
increased people smuggling around 2000 
and unlawful foreign fishing around 2005.
5 During 2006–07 Oceanic Viking also spent 
sixty-three days on fisheries patrol in 
north Australian waters.
6 Drawn from opinions expressed to 
the author during interviews with 
officers from various agencies and from 
annual reports.
7 Depending on circumstances, some boats 
are incinerated on shore but in restricted 
designated areas and under the control of 
AQIS officers.
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AQIS Australian Quarantine and 
Inspection Service
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